Volume 62

Issue 1

Article 6

December 1959

Estate and Gift Tax--Gratuitous Conveyance in Fee Simple--Oral
Retention of Enjoyment by Grantor for Live
E. P. K.
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Taxation-Federal Estate and Gift Commons

Recommended Citation
E. P. K., Estate and Gift Tax--Gratuitous Conveyance in Fee Simple--Oral Retention of Enjoyment by Grantor
for Live, 62 W. Va. L. Rev. (1959).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol62/iss1/6

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

K.: Estate and Gift Tax--Gratuitous Conveyance in Fee Simple--Oral Re
CASE COMMENTS
not be removed without destroying the surface, they would have
specifically mentioned limestone had they intended to convey it.
Beury v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, 144 S.E. 629 (1929). In viewing this
case, at least one noted authority has stated that by a similar
process of reasoning, "strip" coal is not a mineral. Indeed, there
are indications that the West Virginia court may so hold. DoN=,
CoAL, Orr & GAS IN WsT ViRGmA AND VmGINIA §§ 80-33 (1951).
In conclusion, West Virginia has tended to follow the majority
and better view that petroleum oil and natural gas are included
in the term "minerals" as used in a conveyance or exception in a
deed, unless a contrary intent is clearly shown. Under this view
the principal case, which states the applicable and recognized law of
Pennsylvania, is contra to this theory and is definitely the minority
holding. In the writer's opinion, this case would therefore be
followed by very few courts today.
F. L. D., Jr.
ESTATE AND G=rr TAx-GtRTrrous CoNVEYANCE IN FEE SimoENTON
OF ENjoYMENT BY GRANroR FOR Lw-.-Decedent gratuitously executed general warranty deeds to his children
for income-producing real estate. The deeds did not recite any
reservation of interest in either the realty or rents; however, decedent entered into oral agreements with his grantees under which
he was entitled to, and actually did receive, all rents until he died.
The Tax Court of the United States upheld the commissioner's
inclusion of the realty in decedent's estate. Held, that the retention
of the right to the rents, even though disassociated from the instruments of conveyance, did not preclude the application of the retention-of-enjoyment meaning of the statute (Int. Rev. Code of 1954
§ 2036) if decedent in fact did so enjoy the property during his
life. Thus, the value of the premises was properly included in
decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. McNichol
v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959).
PLE-OPAL R

The element maling this case worthy of attention was not the
gratuity of the transaction, but the oral retention of the enjoyment
of the property for life. It is true that the absence of any consideration prevented the transfer from being a bona fide sale, but it
is equally true that the presence of nominal consideration would
not have been "adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth" and thus the transfer would still not have been eligible for
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denomination as bona fide. Before examining the various attempts
to circumvent the statutory section in issue, a brief resum6 of its
history appears germane.
May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930), holding that retention of
life income did not result in the corpus of a trust being included in
the settlor's estate, wreaked havoc upon previous judicial and administrative interpretations of section 302 of the Revenue Act of
1926 which had theretofore uniformly and frequently been construed
to apply to the reserved life estate situation. The decision was
followed in three per curiam opinions on March 2, 1931. Commissioner v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931); Morsman v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 783 (1931); McCormick v. Commissioner,
283 U.S. 784 (1931). To close this obvious tax loophole a joint
resolution was enacted by Congress on March 3, 1931, to make
the retention of a life estate sufficient to require the inclusion
of the corpus upon which it was based in the gross estate of the
settlor. The relevant part of the codification of this resolution provided that the estate would be taxed if the decedent "has retained
for his life . . . (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right
to the income from, the property. . . ." INT. Rv. CODE of 1954 §
2036. The Treasury attempted to give retroactive effect to the
joint resolution until Hasset v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938), declared
its operation prospective only, at which point the Treasury regulations were conformed. An amendment in 1949 provided that no
estate tax was created by the retention of a life estate where the
transfer was made before March 4, 1931, and where the decedent
died before January 1, 1950. 63 Stat. 895 (1949) (now INT. Rzv.
CODE, of 1954 § 2036). It should be noted, however, that the amendment only reflected congressional solicitude for taxpayers who, in
reliance upon the May case, supra, had refrained from divesting
themselves of life estates reserved prior to the Joint Resolution of
1931. The rationale of that resolution remained constant. S. Rep.
No. 831, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
A review of the cases has revealed four general methods by
which life estates have been retained, and taxability imposed, under
section 2036 supra:
I. Retention Apart from Any Legal Instrument
The principal case was the only one found in which there was
clear and admitted evidence of an oral retention. Indeed, research
has yielded only two other federal cases which merit inclusion
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under the heading. This dearth of pertinent cases is also indicated
by the use, in the opinions of these three cases, either of citations
to state cases decided under a similar statutory provision, or of
citations to analogous federal cases.
In Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. United States, 80
F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Calif. 1948) and Harter v. United States,
55-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 55,897 (N.D. Okla. 1954) the retentions of
life estates in the respective properties were not express. The decedents simply continued to enjoy their property by executing, but
failing to deliver, the deeds of conveyance thereto; however, in the
Harter case, supra the arguments of the decedent's executor were
directly in point as was the answer of the District Court at p. 55,399:
"The language of this section . . .does not contemplate, as
taxpayer has contended, that the retained interest must be set
out and provided for in the instrument of transfer ....Rather,
[the section] poses a factual test. Under the clearly apparent
facts in this case the decedent retained what amounted to a
life interest in the property, and the property falls within his
gross estate under the provisions ....
11. Express Retention in the Instrument of Transfer
Pamelia D. Holland, 47 B.T.A. 807 (Oct. 6, 1942), on reconsideration, 1 T.C. 564 (Feb. 10, 1948), and Greene v. United
States, 237 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1956) both involved the transfer of
securities under which transfers the decedents retained a minimum
income therefrom for life. The Holland case had an added ingredient-in addition to a minimum salary for life, decedent retained
possessions of the securities and voting rights for her lifetime as
"collateral." The language of the Greene case is indicative of the
results: "The decisive issue is whether, looking to substance and
not merely to form, the decedent had retained for her life the right
to the income from the property transferred."
III. Express Retention in an Instrument Other Than the Instrument of Transfer
Typical of the few cases in this area was George L. Shearer,
17 T.C. 304 (Sept. 19, 1951). This involved a transfer of a farm
by the decedent to a corporation. Decedent received a lease-back
at nominal rent, under which lease he was to pay expenses and
taxes. The transaction was vulnerable to taxation even though the
lease was subject to cancellation by the corporation and the stock
was donated to the decedent's children.
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IV. Retention in Fact Through Instruments of Reciprocity
This technique involved the reciprocal trust device and was
by far the most common method used in attempts to avoid the
statute. In Moreno's Estate v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 889 (8th
Cir. J.958); Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cr. 1950); and
Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944), the
fact situations were similar. A would create a trust naming B as
life beneficiary with remainder to B's heirs, and B would create a
trust making A the life beneficiary with remainder to A's heirs. Life
estates were contained in the trust instruments, but not for the benefit of the respective settlors; nevertheless, the courts took cognizance
of the fact that the reciprocity accomplished the same ends by technically different means, and the estates were taxed accordingly.
The point here was that the trusts were so regarded because,
in order to ascertain the benefits enuring to A, reference had to be
made to the trust created by B and vice versa. The court in the
principal case skillfully employed the reciprocal trust decisions in
refutation of petitioners arguments, and in support of its position,
"That the reservation need not be expressed in the instrument of
transfer. .. ."

The test applied and the decision reached by the court were
in accord with the weight of authority as reflected in the variations
on the central theme enumerated above. There is an abundance of
cases concerning this problem and most of them, to a greater or
lesser degree, display some semblance of finesse in their attempted
avoidance or evasion. The petitioners in the principal case were
fortunate to have a lawyer who had enough imagination to be able
to provide some thought-provoking legal basis for their amazingly
unsophisticated attempt to avoid the effects of section 2036 supra.
Indeed, in light of his client's maneuvers, the points of counsel
appear ingenuous. By the same token, his client's maneuvers, when
viewed in light of the multifarious schemes which have been discussed here, seem pathetically naive. If the effects of the statute
could be abrogated by a transaction as uncomplicated and candid
as the one tried here, a significant area of revenue would be closed.
E. P. K.
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